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IIn recent decades, innovations in finance, communications and trans-portation have drastically cut the cost of doing business across nationalfrontiers. Capital mobility, transfer pricing, offshore tax havens, Internet
commerce and the creation of global equity exchanges make it ever
more difficult to identify and assess the national origins of income and
profits. Yet taxation schemes remain firmly rooted in personal incomes,
corporate profits and expenditures generated within national borders.
These existing tax systems aren’t popular. They are viewed as overly
complex, inefficient, inequitable and costly to administer. American
politicians entertain such broad fixes as flat rate consumption taxes,
Europe debates the wisdom of “fiscal harmonization,” and Japan mud-
dles through a seemingly endless recession in which tax policy has epi-
sodically been a major bone of contention.
I think the time is ripe to reconsider taxes in the context of the rapid-
ly globalizing economy – a context in which it makes sense to look at
broad-based transaction taxes that could prove a more efficient and
equitable replacement for the hodgepodge of revenue schemes found
around the world. I am under no illusion that such a radical proposal
will be readily implemented. But I do
hope my proposal will spark debate and
research on a fresh set of issues in pub-
lic finance and monetary economics.
an overview
The foundations of the automated pay-
ment transaction tax proposal – a
small, uniform tax on all economic transactions – involve simplification,
base broadening, reductions in marginal tax rates, the elimination of tax
and information returns and the automatic collection of tax revenues at
the payment source. The APT approach would extend the tax base from
income, consumption and wealth to all transactions. It can be viewed as
a public brokerage fee accessed by the government to pay for providing
the monetary, legal and political institutions that facilitate and protectdo
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market trade and commerce.
So-called “tax expenditures” – tax breaks
used to encourage everything from home
ownership to the production of alcohol from
corn – would cease to be an option, effective-
ly forcing governments to make direct expen-
ditures if they chose to favor specific interests.
Such a uniform tax might not, on its face,
look progressive, but probably would be since
the volume of taxed transactions would
almost certainly rise disproportionately with
personal income.
The new tax system would be designed
solely to raise government revenue. I inten-
tionally avoid the contentious issue of how
large the government should be by conceiving
it as a revenue-neutral tax that would replace
other taxes. Simplicity would be achieved by
requiring that all final party transactions be
taxed, and at the same rate.
Since every transaction is settled by some
means of final payment, taxes could be
assessed and collected at the source, through
the automated banking or payment clearing
system at the moment the exchange is com-
pleted. This automatic collection feature
would eliminate the need for individuals and
companies to file tax and information re-
turns. Real-time tax collection at the source 
of payment would apply to all types of trans-
actions, thereby reducing administration and
compliance costs as well as opportunities for
tax evasion.
The APT tax would permit a drastic reduc-
tion in the marginal tax rates on currently
taxed incomes and expenditures by greatly
broadening the tax base. It would therefore
reduce the distortions caused by taxing pro-
ductive activity, recapturing much of what
economists call the “dead weight” efficiency
losses created by the current tax system. Most
important among these is a reduction in mar-
ginal tax rates on wages and salaries that cre-
ate wedges between the cost of labor and the
returns to work.
These efficiency gains would be offset in
part by the distortions created in taxing trans-
actions that are now not taxed. These possible
distortions include incentives to integrate
businesses vertically, a reduction in the liq-
uidity of financial instruments used to hedge
business risk, a lengthening of the term of
debt and the holding period of financial
assets, and incentives to seek payment substi-
tutes and offshore tax havens. Some econo-
mists have suggested that the painlessness of
APT tax collection could also reduce public
resistance to the growth in government – the
Leviathan issue in public choice theory.
But as I discuss below, there is every reason
to believe that the net effect would be a sub-
stantial gain in efficiency. Some of the distor-
tions created by a transaction tax might even
increase overall efficiency; James Tobin, the
Nobel Prize-winning economist, has long ar-
gued that very low transactions costs in finan-
cial markets can result in excessive volatility.
The equity and fairness of the APT tax sys-
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tem also deserve a critical look. But the bot-
tom line is reassuring: The wealthiest portion
of the population executes a disproportionate
share of total transactions.
The APT tax reform would create winners
and losers, but along lines that most people
would find desirable. The greatest beneficia-
ries will be those whose current level of taxes
are considerably reduced, primarily wage and
salary earners with modest assets. Those most
likely to perceive themselves as losers are indi-
viduals and financial institutions that make
markets for assets, along with those who sell
advice on how to minimize taxes under the
current system.
the size of the apt tax base 
and the tax rate
The potential benefits of a universal transac-
tion tax are largely tied to the fact a broader
tax base would require much lower marginal
tax rates to generate the revenues now raised
by taxing income and consumption. But to
get a fix on this “revenue neutral” rate, one
must calculate the amount of revenue that
needs to be raised and the volume of transac-
tions to be taxed.
Table 1 shows the
source of United States
tax revenues that the
APT tax would to re-
place. (These numbers,
incidentally, do not
include contributions for social security pro-
grams, state and local property taxes and user
fees, which I would not replace with an APT
tax.) In 1996, the two major sources of feder-
al and state revenues were income taxes (74
percent) and excise taxes (24 percent). The
revenue-neutral APT tax devised to replace
federal, state and local personal and corporate
income, excise, gift and estate taxes would
thus have been required to yield tax revenues
of $1,357 billion in 1996.
Now for an estimate of the APT tax base,
which consists primarily of debits to accounts
that permit the settlement of claims by check,
wire transfer or direct debit. Debits and cred-
its to bank and brokerage accounts are recor-
ded as part of routine accounting practices.
Thus, the collection and aggregation of debit
statistics would impose a minimal added bur-
den on the financial community.
I use two estimates of total payments. The
first is the Federal Reserve’s measure that
includes debits to all insured commercial
bank demand deposits and to other accounts
that can be debited by check. The
second is the Bank for Intern-
ational Settlements’ estimate of
the value of total payments,
adjusted for double counting. To
these estimates add an estimate of
the total volume of payments
made with currency. Figure 1 reveals that cash
payments make up only 3 percent of total
payments.
In 1996, the APT tax base was 98 times
larger than the income tax base as measured
by the Internal Revenue Service’s estimate of
Adjusted Gross Income. Given an estimated
initial APT tax base in 1996 equal to some
$445 trillion and a required level of tax rev-
enues of $1,357 billion, the revenue-neutral
TABLE 1: REVENUES TO BE REPLACED 
BY APT TAX FOR 1996
source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product
Accounts of the United States and Survey of Current Business.
Individual Income Tax $656 $149 $806 59%
Corporate Income Tax $172 $35 $206 15%
Excise and Customs Tax $73 $250 $323 24%
Estate and Gift Tax $17 $5 $22 2%
Total $918 $439 $1,357 100%
FEDERAL
DOLLARS
(BIL.)REVENUE SOURCE
STATE &
LOCAL
DOLLARS
(BIL.)
TOTAL
DOLLARS
(BIL.) PERCENT
tax rate per transaction would equal 0.3 per-
cent. Thus, each party to a transaction would
be required to pay an APT tax of 0.15 percent.
Although most of my analysis focuses on
the United States, it is interesting to look at the
potential APT tax base in other highly devel-
oped economies.
Figure 2 displays the ratio of
the volume of Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements payments to
GDP for the United States, Japan
and seven European nations. The
ratios for Japan and Switzerland
are roughly twice as high as that
for the United States, whereas the average of
the other European countries is 13 percent
below that for the United States. This suggests
that the estimated revenue-neutral APT tax
rate for European countries would be slightly
higher than that for the U.S., while the rev-
enue-neutral APT tax rate for Japan would be
somewhat lower.
One flaw in the calculation of the transac-
tion tax base is obvious: even a low tax rate of
approximately 0.15 percent for each buyer
and seller would create incentives to econo-
mize on the volume of transac-
tions. What’s needed to adjust the
measure to a more realistic equi-
librium figure is an estimate of the
sensitivity of transactions to
changes in costs – in the parlance
of economics, the elasticity of
total transactions with respect to
transaction costs.
To calculate the impact, one
must get a sense of the relative
changes in transaction costs that
would be induced by the tax. And
that’s a problem because we have
no means of measuring and track-
ing aggregate transaction costs
over time. At best, we may be able
to measure costs in particular markets and
examine estimates of the relevant elasticities.
I have been able to account for roughly 66
percent of the payment estimates. Missing are
all transactions in tangible assets, including
real estate, raw materials, art and commercial
enterprises as well as exchanges of financial
assets and liabilities that are not included in
readily available macroaccounting sources. Of
the $294 trillion in measured transactions
annually, 77 percent comprise money-chang-
ing transactions, foreign exchange transac-
tions and bond market transactions. Equity,
options and mutual funds transactions ac-
count for an additional 5 percent, while goods
transactions account for roughly 11 percent.
Estimates of the elasticity of stock trading
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FIGURE 1: ESTIMATE OF THE APT TAX BASE
volume to transaction costs range from 0.26
in the United States to 1 for the Stockholm
stock exchange. That is, a 10 percent increase
in trading costs would reduce the volume of
transactions in the U.S. by 2.6 percent.
Now consider the level of transaction costs
paid for equity trades by the largest institu-
tional investors in Europe, Japan and the
United States. In 1999, these ranged from a
low of 0.27 percent in Germany to a high of
0.9 percent in Luxembourg. Since 1996, equi-
ty-trading costs have declined in many coun-
tries, sometimes by nearly half. Indeed, on
average, equity transaction costs ran about
0.762 percent in 1996.
Combining the transaction cost estimates
and the equity turnover elasticity estimates,
we can estimate the consequences of intro-
ducing an initial APT tax with a flat rate of 0.3
percent in 1996. The average percentage
decline in trading volumes over all countries
could be as low as 9 percent or as high as 33
percent. But several factors suggest that the
lower estimate is more likely. First, the
breadth of the APT tax would eliminate easy
substitution options – you couldn’t shift to,
say, trading bonds to escape the tax. Second,
overall transaction costs are falling rapidly,
implying that the tax would be offset in part
by reductions in other trading costs. Last but
hardly least, the concomitant elimination of
income and capital gains taxes would reduce
impediments to realizing profits.
The consequences of transaction taxes on
foreign exchange have been most widely dis-
cussed in the context of James Tobin’s 1972
proposal to “throw some sand in the wheels 
of speculation.” Annual foreign exchange 
volume in the U.S.
amounted to $67.3
trillion in 1996 and
rose to $84.2 trillion
in 1998. The volume
of foreign exchange is
made up of 42 percent
in spot transactions,
11 percent in forward
contracts and 47 per-
cent in swaps. Perhaps
40 percent of this vol-
ume represents short-
term trades of seven
days or less. A 0.15
percent APT tax on a
security that turned
over each week would thus amount to an 
annualized tax rate of roughly 15 percent –
certainly enough to induce investors to
reduce trading volume substantially and to
increase holding periods. Yet, while we are
confident that the tax could have a real im-
pact of currency trading, we don’t have much
clue about the
magnitude. Under
the circumstances,
the best one can
do is to provide a
sensitivity analysis
that determines
the revenue-neutral APT tax rate under dif-
ferent assumptions.
A 50 percent decline in the volume of
transactions would require a revenue-neutral
APT rate of 0.3 percent on each party. A 70
percent decline – a decline that would return
the United States to the level of transactions
that prevailed in the mid-1980s – would raise
the rate to 0.51 percent. For purposes of illus-
tration, I’ll assume that total transaction vol-
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RATIO OF
PAYMENTS
TO GDPCOUNTRY
U.K. 43.9
Italy 34.8
Netherlands 37.9
France 41.3
Belgium 44.6
Germany 68.9
U.S. 86.2
Japan 101.6
Switzerland 105.3
source: Bank for International Settlements 
(1998) and author’s calculations.
FIGURE 2:
RATIO OF PAYMENTS 
TO GDP, 1997
umes would decline by half, requiring a uni-
form flat rate on all transactions of 0.6 per-
cent divided equally between the buyer and
seller of each transaction.
who pays?
To gauge the distributional impact of the APT
tax, it is necessary to estimate the distribution
of payments made by different income class-
es. Here, I simulate the transactions patterns
of U.S. households from their wealth compo-
sition, as revealed in the Federal Reserve’s
Survey of Consumer Finances. Applying
turnover rates to each of the assets and liabil-
ities held in household portfolios of particu-
lar income categories, it is possible to simu-
late the volume of transactions undertaken by
households in different income classes.
Figure 3 displays the simulated ratios of
transactions to income. Higher income
groups account for
the largest propor-
tion of transactions,
implying that they
would pay a far
greater proportion of
the tax than lower
income groups. In-
deed, the ratios are so
skewed that a uni-
form tax on transac-
tions would be highly
progressive for tax-
payers with incomes
exceeding $75,000.
administration and compliance
The everyday operation of the modern finan-
cial system already requires the maintenance
of exact records of debits and credits to deter-
mine customers’ current balances. In practice,
the proposed APT tax revenue assessment
and collection system would demand only a
software modification to existing
financial institution accounting
procedures. The change would
create a virtual tax payment
account (TPA) linked to every
customer’s financial account. Fi-
nancial intermediaries would be
required to maintain a positive balance in the
linked TPA somewhat in excess of expected
tax payments. Every debit or credit to the pri-
mary account would trigger a corresponding
debit in the TPA account equal to the debit
amount multiplied by the flat tax rate. The
revenue would be electronically transferred to
the government. All taxes would thus be as-
sessed and collected at the time the transac-
tion is consummated.
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FIGURE 3: RATIO OF NET WORTH AND 
TRANSACTIONS TO INCOME BY INCOME GROUPS
source: Author’s simulations based on Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances.
All tax systems, including the APT, are vul-
nerable to evasion when paper currency is
freely available. Since the administrative costs
of policing currency transactions are clearly
prohibitive, another form of taxation would
be needed to eliminate the bias toward cur-
rency usage. One practical approach: exact a
tax on currency each time it leaves and enters
the banking system.
To be effective, the tax rate charged on cur-
rency would have to be higher than the rate
on checking. Indeed, currency would need to
be taxed some multiple of the tax on check
payments equal to what the great economist
Irving Fisher called “the cash loop.”
The cash loop is the average number of in-
stances that a unit of currency is used as a
means of payment between the time it enters
into circulation and the time it is returned to
the banking system. Fisher estimated the U.S.
cash loop as approximately two payments
between withdrawals and redeposit; more
recently, I estimated a cash loop for the
Netherlands as approximately four payments.
If the actual after-tax cash loop is eight
turnovers and the APT tax rate were 0.3 per-
cent, a 1.2 percent premium charged on cur-
rency at the point of its withdrawal from
banks, coupled with a 1.2 percent discount on
currency at the point of its return to the
banking system, would be sufficient to equal-
ize the incentives to use currency and checks
as a final means of payment. Individuals and
companies requiring currency would have to
purchase each dollar of currency for $1.012,
and when currency was returned to the bank-
ing system, it would be exchanged for deposit
money at 98.8 cents per dollar. To distribute
the added costs of currency usage, retail con-
cerns would presumably charge a fee for cash
payments in much the way as they occasion-
ally add a premium for credit card sales.
Disallowing exemptions and deductions,
along with assessing and collecting taxes auto-
matically, would eliminate the largest compo-
nents of administration and compliance
costs. There would no longer be a need for
individuals to file tax returns, nor for compa-
nies to file information returns. The automat-
ic revenue collection feature produces a real-
time taxpayer account that automatically pro-
vides every taxpayer with a transparent record
of his or her direct tax payments.
The direct costs of collecting the individ-
ual income tax in the United States amounts
to between 7 percent and 8 percent of rev-
enues raised. For the year 1982, that came to
$30 billion to $35 billion, with taxpayers
spending approximately two billion hours to
comply with the law. Extrapolating these esti-
mates suggests that total annual collection
and compliance costs are well in excess of
$100 billion.
By freeing companies and
individuals from the onerous
and costly task of determining
their specific tax base, tax rate
and tax liability, the APT collec-
tion system would bring the
marginal costs of collection and compliance
down to the cost of electronic transfers of
information. The low APT tax rate would
reduce the payoff from tax avoidance, even as
the automated assessment and collection fea-
ture raised the costs of these activities.
Tax evasion is another major cost of the
present tax system. The IRS projected 1992
unreported legal-source income on individ-
ual income tax returns at $587 billion, while
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my own research suggests that unpaid taxes
totaled $123 billion in that year.
Every tax can be avoided and evaded. The
question is, at what cost? Since the APT tax is
collected through the payments mechanism,
it could be avoided by engaging in barter
transactions. But barter is extremely costly,
reducing the cases in which it would pay to
evade the small tax to insignificant propor-
tions. Tax evasion through “offshore” exchan-
ges poses a subtler problem that could be
addressed by structuring appropriate penal-
ties to provide serious disincentives. One way
would be to deny the parties to any untaxed
transaction the right to legal protection from
the state, much the way courts refuse to
enforce payments in gambling debts.
A second device, proposed by Peter Kenen
of Princeton University, would be to apply the
tax at a penalty rate to all transactions made
with financial institutions in tax-free jurisdic-
tions. Alternatively, APT tax-compliant na-
tions could refuse to recognize credits or deb-
its from “offshore” havens or non-APT coun-
tries that countenance “counterfeit” financial
transactions. Every off-
shore exchange must have
points of connection with
the payment and clearing
systems of the world’s
legitimate financial mar-
kets. These connection
points are their Achilles’ heels, since, once 
severed from the mother ship, the tax haven
ceases to function.
Under the APT system, Internet transac-
tions that are paid by credit, debit or stored
value cards would pose no collection prob-
lem. Credit and debit card payments would
be taxed when the customer settles accounts
with the card issuer, and stored value cards
would be taxed when they were recharged
with a debit to a financial account.
Technological innovations such as anony-
mous forms of digital cash that represent a
private substitute for the government’s pre-
sent monopoly of issuing currency could
raise collection problems in any tax regime.
Such e-cash could accumulate and simply be
transferred from party to party without
returning to the banking system. Thus, if
anonymous private digital cash were permit-
ted to substitute freely for government paper
currency, it could function as a tax evasion
vehicle. Given this concern, it would make
sense for the government to issue its own e-
cash and to treat private inside money
designed to evade taxes as counterfeiting.
the role of government
The APT tax system would shift the state’s
role from an active partner in the outcomes of
the game of exchange to that of a disinterest-
ed ticket-taker. The government would sim-
ply establish the costs of admission. Those
who chose to make exchanges would bear the
full burden of mistakes and reap the full
advantages of successes.
By the same token, the APT
tax would eliminate all tax
exemptions and tax credits. The
history of past tax systems amply
demonstrates the vulnerability to
special interests of any tax system
that permits exemptions, exclu-
sions and credits. According to the Congres-
sional Budget Office, tax expenditures am-
ounted to $470 billion in the 1996 fiscal year.
Denying the revenue collection mechanism
the role of redistributing resources this way
would restore the comprehensibility and sim-
plicity of the tax system. Moreover, the elimi-
nation of hidden tax expenditures would
force the government to appropriate funds
for all services and transfer payments, making
50 The Milken Institute Review
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the level of expenditures explicit and subject
to direct political evaluation.
The APT tax design must also address the
issue of fiscal federalism. State and local prop-
erty taxes and user fees would continue to
provide the same level of revenue as before,
since the APT is not intended to replace these
revenue sources. State income and excise
taxes would, however, be eliminated and
replaced through the APT tax system. The
states could establish resident-specific taxpay-
er accounts directly linked to the taxpayer’s
federal TPA account. Every final payment
would trigger both an automatic federal pay-
ment and a state resident payment. The states
could therefore collect taxes electronically as a
form of automated revenue sharing.
economic efficiency
The transactions directly associated with the
production of final goods and services
amount to roughly twice GDP. Thus, al-
though these transactions represent less than
5 percent of total transactions, they constitute
the principal portion of the current tax base.
The APT tax on payments related to the final
production of goods and services is equiva-
lent to a flat-rate personal income tax (on
wages, interest, dividends and rents), a flat
rate corporate income tax and a differentiated
expenditure tax. The reduction of average
and marginal tax rates on current taxable in-
come from more than 30 percent to approxi-
mately 0.3 percent would drastically reduce
the present tax incentive to substitute leisure
for work. Since the APT tax system would
include neither personal deductions nor
exemptions, it would also eliminate current
distortions that favor some types of income
while discouraging others.
When fringe benefits are not taxed as part
of employee income, companies have an in-
centive to provide such benefits even though
their costs exceed what employees would oth-
erwise be willing to pay. Under the APT tax,
employees, whose marginal tax rates on wages
and salaries would be reduced from roughly
30 percent to 0.3 percent, would have little
incentive to overconsume fringes, choosing
instead to take wages as direct payments.
Note, too, that the APT tax would funda-
mentally change the incentives facing compa-
nies, altering the rules of doing business. The
state’s present extensive participation in the
costs of doing business provides companies
with perverse incentives to inflate overall
costs since they now serve to reduce overall
tax liabilities. Moreover, depreciation rules,
interest deductions and deductibility of par-
ticular forms of compensation create major
distortions in companies’ choices of deprecia-
tion schedules, modes of financing invest-
ment and payment of compensation
to factors of production. With the
APT tax, companies would be free to
select internal depreciation methods
that reflect the actual replacement
costs of their capital stock, the most
efficient methods of financing invest-
ment and the least costly compensation pack-
ages. Finally, the APT tax would reduce dis-
tortions created by the wide range of tax rates
on different classes of investment.
Subjecting trade in unfinished goods and
services to the APT tax base would be analo-
gous to introducing a small, flat-rate turnover
tax. Given the knee-jerk antagonism of most
economists to the mere mention of a
turnover tax, it is important to clarify the like-
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ly extent and nature of the distortions. First,
the turnover component of the APT would be
small since total intermediate transactions
make up less that 5 percent of total payments
in the economy. Second, I doubt that the APT
tax would result in substantial vertical inte-
gration of businesses since in most cases,
gains from specialization are likely to be large
relative to the size of the broad-based APT
tax. More likely, the APT tax would simply
slow the trend toward vertical disintegration
brought about by growing markets that favor
specialization. Technological advances in
Internet business-to-business cost savings are
likely over time to offset the incentives toward
integration produced by the APT levy.
The international transaction component
of the APT tax is a variant of what has be-
come known as the “Tobin tax.” Tobin’s con-
cern arose from what he considered “the
excessive international – or better, inter-cur-
rency – mobility of private financial capital,”
which has rendered governments incapable of
adjusting to disturbances in international fi-
nancial markets “without real hardship and
without significant sacrifice of the objectives
of national economic policy with respect to
employment, output and inflation.”
The advantages and shortcomings of tax-
ing foreign transactions have been extensively
analyzed. A modest tax on international flows
would be unlikely to hamper international
trade, being small compared with transporta-
tion costs and not exceeding the cost of using
forward and future markets to hedge against
currency fluctuations. Since the relative
importance of the APT tax would decrease
with the length of maturity of financial con-
tracts, the tax would primarily affect “hot
money” transactions seeking to profit from
the arbitrage possibilities created by minute
price differentials. Unlike the Tobin tax,
which proponents see as a possible revenue
source for multilateral organizations like the
World Bank, the APT tax would go to nation-
al tax authorities.
All voluntary exchanges undertaken at
prices that fully reflect the costs of production
are “welfare enhancing,” since they allocate
resources to their highest valued use. The
same principle applies to exchanges of assets.
However, under the present tax system, the
fees charged for financial exchanges only
reflect private costs, while the cost of operat-
ing the government now falls on the markets
for goods, services and factors of production.
Consider, too, that speculative exchanges
can lead to situations in which the losses
exceed the gains. Indeed, John Maynard
Keynes’s argument for a tax on asset transac-
tions has not lost its salience today, with
admirers ranging from Tobin
to the Stanford economist
Joseph Stiglitz to Treasury
Secretary Larry Summers. Of
course, the direct effect of any
transfer tax would reduce the
liquidity of financial markets
and might increase price volatility. However,
if the imposition of the APT tax were syn-
chronized with the elimination of capital
gains taxation, the net effect would surely be
to increase market liquidity.
The APT transfer tax would provide an
incentive to lengthen the holding period of
both equity and debt instruments. The
biggest effect would be on short-term trades
intended to capture small percentage returns
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to portfolios by getting on or off the “band-
wagon” of what is believed to be current mar-
ket psychology. By increasing the cost of fre-
quent trading, the APT tax provides incen-
tives for analysts to direct their talents to the
search for long-term profits rather than
short-term trading. Summers has also argued
that the higher costs of frequent trading
would extend corporate management’s in-
vestment horizons and give shareholders
greater incentives to monitor management.
To calculate the net effect of replacing the
current tax system with an APT tax, one must
also take account of the elimination of wealth
taxes. Debt would become more costly as the
government would now charge a brokerage
fee, much the way as banks currently impose
“points” for lending. The loss of deductibility
of interest would also discourage borrowing.
Offsetting these disincentives are the reduc-
tions in income and inheritance taxes and the
elimination of capital gains taxes.
conclusions
To assess the desirability of the APT tax 
proposal, we must weigh its likely benefits
against its likely
costs. The benefits
include estimates
of the total alloca-
tion, administra-
tion, compliance
and evasion costs
of the present system that the APT tax would
replace. Eliminating the waste linked to price
distortions created by the current tax system
could yield annual benefits in excess of $250
billion. The elimination of tax and informa-
tion returns could yield added compliance
costs savings between $100 billion and $200
billion a year. To these savings, add the
reduced administrative and enforcements
costs resulting from the unique automated
collection mechanism of the APT system. The
quantifiable benefits of eliminating the cur-
rent tax system are therefore likely to range
from $350 billion to $500 billion per year. The
intangible benefits of greater simplicity,
transparency and equity would be pure gravy.
Against these benefits weigh the costs of
the new distortions the APT system is likely to
introduce, along with the costs of transition. I
have tried to make the case that the benefits
are likely to exceed the costs by a substantial
margin, but many details need further elabo-
ration. We must learn more about the institu-
tional complexities of domestic and interna-
tional equity, debt and derivative markets,
and acquire better estimates of the extent to
which transaction volumes are likely to fall in
response to the imposition of the APT tax.
By the same token, the distributive conse-
quences of the APT tax system appear to be
progressive since the tax would fall dispro-
portionately on asset exchanges by wealthier
citizens. The tax would, however, induce
responses that diminished its initial redistrib-
utive consequences. Note, too, that since 
tax expenditure redistributions are not an
option under the APT tax,
any further efforts at redistri-
bution would have to be made
through explicit government
expenditures.
The APT tax proposal
embodies the principles that
have guided all successful tax reform propos-
als: simplicity, equity, efficiency and reduced
costs of administration and compliance. To
achieve these ends, it contemplates revenue
neutrality, base broadening, the reduction of
marginal tax rates, a single flat tax rate, the
elimination of tax loopholes, the end of tax
returns and information returns, and the
automatic electronic assessment and collec-
tion of taxes. Not a bad deal, really.
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